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MEDELLIN, DELEGATION AND CONFLICTS (OF LAW)
Peter B. Rutledge
INTRODUCTION
The case of Medellin v. Texas' presented the Supreme Court with a re-
curring question that has bedeviled judges, legal scholars, and political sci-
entists-what effect, if any, must a United States court give to the decision
of an international tribunal, particularly where, during the relevant time, the
United States was party to a treaty protocol that bound it to that tribunal's
judgments.2 While the Supreme Court held that the International Court of
Justice's ("ICJ") decision was not enforceable federal law,3 its decision
reflected an important recognition that the issues presented in that case
were not limited to the specific area of ICJ judgments.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia Law School. Dean Rebecca White supported
this Essay through a generous grant. Steve Young provided invaluable library assistance as he always
does. Sarah Wyss and John DeGenova provided excellent research assistance. Julie Kendrick assisted
with completion of the manuscript. I would like to thank participants in a faculty workshop at the Uni-
versity of Georgia Law School, Pepperdine University School of Law, DePaul University College of
Law, and an American Enterprise Institute symposium on the Medellin case for comments on this Essay
and the ideas expressed herein. Trey Childress, Harlan Cohen, Tony Perez, Amy Schmitz, Ingrid
Wuerth, and John Yoo all provided very valuable comments on the draft.
1 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
2 Id. at 1353. Specifically, Medellin concerned the duty of a United States court to give effect to a
mandate of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). Id. Among other things, the ICJ adjudicates dis-
putes involving the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations insofar as signatory states have signed
onto an optional protocol submitting to the ICJ's jurisdiction. Id. Until recently, the United States was a
signatory to that protocol, and in the 1990s, death penalty foes and international law specialists teamed
up to challenge the capital sentences of foreign citizens who were on death row in the United States and
who had allegedly been deprived of their right to consult with a consul following arrest under Article 36
of the Vienna Convention. Id. at 1354. While the ICJ has issued several judgments in these cases, status
of ICJ judgments in the United States had been unclear. Id. at 1356. Scholars have hotly debated
whether ICJ judgments have direct effect in the United States, and, after passing on the question several
times, the Supreme Court confronted it in Medellin. Id.
For commentary on Medellin, see Paul B. Stephan, Open Doors, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
11 (2009); Ronald A. Brand, Treaties and the Separation of Powers in the United States: A Reassess-
ment After Medellin v. Texas 2 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 2008-33, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract- 1319818; Ingrid B. Wuerth, Medellin:
The New, New Formalism? 2 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper
No. 08-52, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1301283. Two law reviews have dedicated
issues to Medellin: volume 77 of the Fordham Law Review and volume 31 of the Suffolk Transnational
Law Review.
3 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356-57.
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Rather, these issues in Medellin represent simply the latest chapter in a
longstanding and increasingly important debate among academics, political
scientists and public policy experts-the wisdom of "delegations."4 While
the meaning of that term is controversial (a topic I address in Part I), there
is common agreement that delegation at least includes a bilateral (or multi-
lateral) grant of authority to an international institution. This includes rela-
tionships such as the United States' membership in the United Nations or its
accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). Dele-
gations often, though not always, involve a transnational dispute resolution
body such as the NAFTA Dispute Resolution Boards or, in the case of
Medellin, the International Court of Justice. Another current example of this
hotly debated topic is whether the United States should ratify the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas ("UNCLOS"), which has its
own dispute resolution body for boundary disputes.5 Advocates defend rati-
fication as action in the national interest and in furtherance of international
norms; critics decry it as a surrender of United States sovereignty, particu-
larly its naval prerogatives, to unaccountable transnational bureaucrats.
In my view, delegation debates exemplified by cases like Medellin and
the ratification debate over UNCLOS suffer from three related distortions.
First, the term "delegation" has been defined too narrowly. Second, this
unduly narrow definition has caused some participants in the debate to fail
to differentiate between different types of delegations. Third, the unduly
narrow definition and insufficiently nuanced account have skewed the nor-
mative analysis of specific delegations. Conflicts-of-law jurisprudence,
particularly the early jurisprudence from both Europe and nineteenth cen-
tury American conflicts scholars, supplies an important tool to correct all
three distortions.
Part I of this Essay considers the first distortion. It addresses an impor-
tant definitional aspect of this debate-the meaning of delegation. This
issue involves more than mere quibbling over jargon. Rather, it defines the
very scope of the discussion. An unduly narrow definition of delegation
runs the risk of rendering irrelevant a data subset that might influence the
analysis. Conversely, an unduly broad definition of delegation runs the op-
posite risk-defining the relevant sample set so broadly that verifiable con-
clusions cannot be generated or are, at best, so tentative and diluted as to be
useless. Part I reviews the competing definitions offered in the literature. It
4 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept ofInternational Delegation,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2008, at 1. I say "longstanding" for, as Harold Koh has demon-
strated, these debates at a broad level of abstraction simply represent the latest chapter in a much longer,
historical discussion over "domestic obedience to internalized global law." Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2659 (1997) (book review). This is particularly
true following World War 11 where "international institutions governed by multilateral treaties or-
ganiz[ed] proactive assaults on all manner of global problems." Id. at 2614.
5 See Jack Goldsmith & Jeremy Rabkin, Op-Ed., A Treaty the Senate Should Sink, WASH. POST,
July 2, 2007, at At9.
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then defends the following definition of delegation: delegation occurs
whenever a sovereign state grants legislative or adjudicative jurisdiction to
an institution-transnational or otherwise-that is not within the direct
reach of the sovereign. I use the term "institution" in its broad sense-to
encompass more than a physical or juridical entity. Instead, following Pro-
fessor Robert Keohane, I use the term to mean legal regimes, with or with-
out a bureaucratic infrastructure.6 Here, conflicts-of-law scholarship-
which sought to provide a tool for reconciling jurisdictional conflicts
among states in a post-Westphalian world-provides a historically rooted,
well-tested benchmark for redefining delegation.
Part II of this Essay considers the second distortion in the delegation
debate: the lack of a sufficiently nuanced account for classifying delega-
tions. The early delegation debates tended to be bipolar-different camps
criticized or defended delegation generally without really making much
effort to differentiate between types of delegation.' Unfortunately, framing
the debate in this manner overlooks salient differences between various
forms of delegation. Some recent scholarship has begun to recognize the
need for a more sophisticated typology.! This Part reviews those recent ef-
forts and then derives a typology that, drawing on an important distinction
in conflicts jurisprudence, classifies delegations according to the following
criteria: (1) what type of jurisdiction is being delegated (legislative vs. judi-
cial), (2) does the delegation create a new bureaucracy (or instead rely on
preexisting institutions), and (3) are the decisions of the newly created bu-
reaucracy automatically domesticated (or instead rely on domestic institu-
tions to give legal effect to their decisions)? In contrast to previous
schemes, this one better permits a more nuanced normative debate about
delegation.
Part III addresses the third and final distortion: the need for a more nu-
anced normative debate over the costs and benefits of delegations. It begins
by laying out an account of the costs of delegation (such as the loss of sov-
ereignty) and the benefits of delegation (such as improved coordination).
Part III then evaluates the costs and benefits through the lens of the con-
flicts-based typology developed in Part II; it discusses how particular dele-
gations, depending on whether they involve legislative or judicial jurisdic-
tion, organizational or non-organizational activity and automatic or non-
automatic domestication, will entail different mixtures of costs and benefits.
6 See Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?, FOREIGN
POL'Y, Spring 1998, at 82, 84-85.
7 A notable exception to this bipolar debate is the excellent article by Edward T. Swaine, The
Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492 (2004). See especially his
alternative typology of delegation that broadens the definition beyond vesting of authority in interna-
tional institutions. Id. at 1506-30; see also Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System,
56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 448 (2003) (recognizing the synergies between issues of delegation of judicial
power to a transnational institution and the treatment of a state's judicial acts by another state judiciary).
8 See, e.g., Bradley& Kelley, supra note 4, at 10-17; Swaine,supra note 7, at 1506.
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Part III concludes with a discussion of the lessons of the Medellin case for
the future of the delegation debate.
While this Essay seeks to remedy these three distortions in the delega-
tion debate, it is important to identify at the outset what it does not seek to
do. It does not offer an opinion on the constitutionality of a particular dele-
gation. Nor is it meant to provide a normative guidebook for the acceptabil-
ity or unacceptability of a delegation. Rather, my ambition is more lim-
ited-by correcting these three distortions in the debate, I hope to refocus
the debate along terms that will facilitate those broader constitutional and
normative discussions, whether in the arena of a decision to enact legisla-
tion or a judicial decision to apply foreign law.
I. DEFINITIONS
This Part addresses a critical definitional point in the delegation de-
bate-the meaning of delegation. Most scholars frame this debate in terms
of grants of authority to international organizations such as the World Trade
Organization. In Part I.A, I challenge that traditional framing of the debate.
In my view, this definition takes an unduly narrow view of delegation is-
sues. In Part I.B, I defend a broader view of delegation, one rooted in
choice-of-law principles. Under this view, delegation occurs whenever a
sovereign state grants legislative or adjudicative jurisdiction to an institu-
tion-transnational or otherwise-that is not within the direct reach of the
sovereign. This definition encompasses a wide variety of acts excluded
from the traditional definition such as choice-of-law treaties, assimilative
legislation, and the enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards.
A. Orthodoxy in the Delegation Debate
Epistemologically, academic debates, legal or otherwise, naturally or-
bit around a common vernacular. 9 Terminological agreement, in theory at
least, is indispensable. If we cannot agree on what we're talking about, how
can we possibly have a coherent discussion? For example, when astrono-
mers discuss the planets of the "solar system," the efficacy of that debate
may depend on a common agreement about the bodies qualifying as planets
and the scope of the solar system.
At the same time, the common terminological ground framing a debate
carries an attendant risk. The risk is that the terms of the debate become
ossified and, worse yet, cease to be examined. Failure to reexamine these
terms has two unfortunate consequences. It distracts the positive inquiry-
9 See Jonathan Grix, Introducing Students to the Generic Terminology of Social Research, 22
POL. 175, 176 (2002).
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scholars engaging the debate dedicate their energy to the debate as defined
by others rather than questioning whether the debate even has been appro-
priately framed. It also distorts the normative discussion-participants in
the debate prescribe solutions to an ill-defined problem.
The current debate over international delegation suffers from some of
these same problems." Most-but certainly not all-participants frame the
debate in terms of a fairly specific problem: the transfer of authority to an
international organization." Both advocates and skeptics of delegation have
employed this definition (which I call the "orthodox" view). For example,
Curtis Bradley has defined delegation as "a grant of authority by two or
more states to an international body to make decisions or take actions."' 2
Julian Ku has defined delegation as "the transfer of constitutionally-
assigned federal powers-treaty-making, legislative, executive, and judicial
powers-to an international organization."' 3 Oona Hathaway defines dele-
gation as the granting of domestic authority to international institutions. 4
Other examples abound in the scholarly literature. 5
While the delegation debate has largely been framed around these
terms, some participants have acknowledged imperfections in this defini-
tion. The best example of someone who has largely rejected this definition
of delegation is Edward Swaine. Swaine recognizes that acts that do not
necessarily create organizations, such as assimilation of foreign law or cus-
tomary international law, still are properly characterized as delegations. 6
Even those employing the traditional definition sometimes hint that the
debate could be broadened. For example, Ku also notes that a legislature
can delegate by assimilation, meaning that countries can delegate their
10 For a thoughtful critique in this area published as I was completing this Essay, see Andrew T.
Guzman & Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1693, 1698-1701
(2008).
11 Two critical sources of scholarship on this debate include the excellent symposium organized at
Duke University Law School and a series of earlier path-breaking articles in the journal International
Organization. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 4, at 2; Robert 0. Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolu-
tion: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT'L ORG. 457, 459 (2000). Other valuable sources include
Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 10, at 1693; Swaine, supra note 7, at 1494-95; Ernest A. Young, The
Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 527, 527-28 (2003); Julian G. Ku, The Dele-
gation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 71, 72 (2000); Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 287 (1997).
12 Bradley & Kelley, supra note 4, at 3.
13 Ku, supra note ll,at 72.
14 See Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 2008, at 115, 115-16.
15 See, e.g., Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organiza-
tions, and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
3, 7 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006).
16 Swaine,supra note 7, at 1519-30.
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lawmaking power by adopting foreign legal rules as their own.' 7 Likewise,
Hathaway acknowledges the need for a more expansive inquiry and ex-
plains that "[i]nternational law and international delegation are deeply inter-
twined."'" By these hedges, the authors suggest that the terms of the delega-
tion debate can be meaningfully broadened.
To understand why the terms of the delegation debate should be
broadened, it is helpful to understand why people are so concerned about
delegation.'9 At bottom, skeptics of delegation are largely-though cer-
tainly not exclusively--concerned with the loss of sovereignty and political
accountability. Nightmares of faceless international bureaucrats who do not
have the national interest at heart are the poster child for the skeptics. E"
Conversely, supporters of delegation are largely-though again not exclu-
sively--concerned with both the benefits that come from international co-
operation and the normative advancements enabled by international coop-
eration. Human rights and international criminal tribunals are their poster
children.2'
Once we step back from the definitions of delegation and instead con-
sider the stakes behind the delegation debate, we can begin to appreciate
that these underlying policy concerns, both of the skeptics and the advo-
cates, can arise in situations other than simply through the grant of authority
to an international body. As to the skeptics' concern about loss of sover-
eignty, that can occur even without a transfer of power to an international
organization. Consider assimilative statutes. Those statutes establish certain
liability rules but define those rules by reference to some external norm. For
example, the Lacey Act prohibits wildlife trade in violation of, among other
things, "foreign" law.22 Here, no international organization is involved, yet
an entity other than the sovereign itself is exercising a rulemaking power
that affects liability rules within the sovereign's jurisdiction.
As to the supporters' interest in advancing international norms, con-
sider human rights lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute.23 The Alien Tort
Statute grants federal jurisdiction over certain torts in violation of the "law
of nations."24 While the Supreme Court made clear in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain5 that this statute is nominally a jurisdictional statute, it also made
clear that federal common law can recognize a limited number of causes of
action derived from customary international law (in effect, another type of
17 Ku, supra note 11, at 105.
18 Hathaway, supra note 14, at 117.
19 See infra Part Ill.
20 See Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 10, at 1694.
21 Hathaway, supra note 14, at 145-48.
22 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (2006). Edward Swaine drew this example to my attention. See Swaine,
supra note 7, at 1520.
23 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
24 Id.
25 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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assimilation).26 Customary international law derives not from the federal
sovereign but rather from the consistent practices of states as evidenced in
their official statements, judicial decisions, international agreements and
other diplomatic actions. 27 Some lower courts have even discarded any pre-
text of relying on federal common law and instead held that international
law supplies the relevant liability rule.2 ' Here, as in the assimilation case
described above, the example implicates core issues of the delegation de-
bate but does not entail a grant of authority to an international organization.
Other, less charged, examples help seal the point. For example, the
1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
("New York Convention") contains various grounds upon which a court can
refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award.29 Some of those grounds permit a
court to refuse enforcement by reference to a substantive law other than the
enforcement forum. For example, a court may refuse enforcement if, bar-
ring party agreement, the procedure was not in accordance with the proce-
dural law of the arbitral forum.3" Likewise, both the Hague Evidence Con-
vention and the Hague Service Convention obligate signatory countries to
designate "central authorities" that will serve properly drafted letters roga-
tory on persons within their territory.3 The recently approved (but not yet
ratified) Hague Convention on Choice of Courts Agreement, among other
things, obligates the judicial branch of signatory nations generally to sus-
pend litigation in favor of the country specified in a choice of courts clause
and generally to enforce judgments rendered by that country.3 2 All of these
examples share a same common feature-they bind a sovereign actor in
some manner determined by reference to a rule or act of another entity not
within the direct reach of the sovereign. Thus, a variety of international acts
26 Id. at 712.
27 GARY BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 15 (4th ed. 2007).
28 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam), affd
for lack of quorum sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008); Doe I v.
Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 949 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th
Cir. 200); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320-21
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1343-49 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
29 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 5, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. For a recent essay that
acknowledges the conceptual linkage between judicial enforcement of arbitral awards and other forms
of delegation, see Ernest A. Young, Supranational Rulings as Judgments and Precedents, 18 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 477, 491-92 (2008).
30 New York Convention, supra note 29, art. 5.
31 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters art. 5, opened
for signature July 27, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Conven-
tion]; Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters art. 2,
Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention].
32 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 8, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294.
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entail the core concerns and benefits of participants in the delegation debate
yet do not involve the creation of any international organization.
These sorts of delegations are not confined to judicial inquiry into a
treaty's meaning; a variety of other doctrines, many of them the product of
federal common law, involve similar considerations of a foreign sover-
eign's law of interests. For example, the act of state doctrine, the doctrine of
comity, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens all fall within this defini-
tion. Some, such as the act of state doctrine, expressly require application of
the foreign sovereign's law.33 Others, such as the forum non conveniens
doctrine, involve a less explicit consideration of the foreign sovereign's
interests in the dispute.34 In each case, a court in the United States is ex-
pressly considering foreign legal authority, over which the United States
has no control, to decide whether and how to resolve a matter.
Indeed, the debate between the majority and dissenters in Medellin il-
lustrates the conceptual linkages between these different sorts of delega-
tions. Part of the debate in Medellin concerned the proper lesson to be
drawn from treaties such as the Washington Convention and the New York
Convention for the status of ICJ judgments.3 5 The majority and dissent dif-
fered over the extent to which the self-executing nature of those documents
imposed binding obligations under federal law.36 Yet all nine Justices
shared the common view that the commitments created under those treaties,
even though they did not involve a supranational organization like the ICJ,
nonetheless implicated issues common to the delegation questions pre-
sented by Medellin."
At this point, it is worth pausing to verify the narrowness of my claim
so far. My point simply is that the orthodox view defines the term delega-
tion too narrowly. Defining it solely to include the "transfer of constitution-
ally assigned powers"38 to an international organization fails to capture
various mechanisms such as assimilative laws, references to customary
international law, and private international law treaties that raise the same
underlying issues-such as loss of sovereignty or the advancement of inter-
national norms-but do not involve any international organization. At this
point, I take no position on whether claims about the costs and benefits are
well-founded or, assuming they are, how extensive they are in a particular
case. Part III returns to those topics. For now, I simply want to make the
reader uncomfortable enough with the orthodoxy that she recognizes the
need to broaden the definition of delegation to some degree.
33 See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,409 (1990).
34 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981).
35 Compare Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1366 (2008), with id. at 1387-88 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
36 Id. at 1365 (majority opinion).
37 Id.
38 Ku, supra note 11, at 91.
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B. Broadening Delegation: A Conflicts-of-Law Perspective
If the orthodox definition of "delegation" is too narrow, what should
take its place? In my view, delegation occurs whenever a sovereign state
grants legislative or adjudicative jurisdiction to an institution-
transnational or otherwise-that is not within the direct reach of the sover-
eign. This broadened definition obviously draws heavily on conflicts-of-law
principles. The remainder of this section explains this reliance on conflicts
principles and justifies the definition.
The relationship between sovereignty and conflicts-of-law has a long
history and has been well documented. 9 A variety of historical writers in
the conflicts-of-law field have recognized the relationship between notions
of sovereignty and conflicts principles." For example, Ulrich Huber, a sev-
enteenth century Dutch writer, captured this relationship in his three semi-
nal precepts of international law:
(1) Every state's laws apply within the state's territory, but not beyond;
(2) All persons within a state are subjects of the state;
(3) "Comity" calls on states to recognize and enforce rights created by other states provided
that such recognition does not prejudice the state or its subjects.4'
Huber's first precept recognized the relationship between territory,
sovereignty, and legislative jurisdiction-that is, the power to prescribe
rules governing conduct, relationships, or status (a principle in harmony
with the views of delegation's skeptics).42 At the same time, Huber recog-
nized in his third precept that these rigid, territorially defined notions of
sovereignty left some room for the development of connective tissue be-
tween states (a principle in harmony with the views of delegation's advo-
cates). Consider closely Huber's phrasing of his third principle. When he
speaks in terms of comity, he speaks not simply in terms of recognition of
39 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 539, at 450 (2d ed. 1841)
("[N]o sovereignty can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits, to subject either persons or
property to its judicial decisions."); Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law,
2 AM. J. COMP. L. 297, 305-07 (1953); ROBERT A. LEFLAR, THE LAW OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § I 0, at
207-09 (1959).
40 See ERNEST G. LORENZEN, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 136, 138-39 (1947). For teaching me about the relationship between international
law and conflicts principles, I am grateful to my colleague, co-author, and friend, Gary Born. See BORN
& RUTLEDGE, supra note 27, at 564-66. While the current edition of our international litigation case-
book addresses some aspects of this relationship, Gary deserves the credit for developing these notions
in earlier editions of the book. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 493-497 (3d ed. 1996).
41 LORENZEN, supra note 40, at 136-37.
42 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401
(1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 cmt. d (1971).
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rights created by a foreign state but also enforcement of those rights.43 That
is, one state should be prepared, within limits, to enforce rights created by a
foreign state. In other words, in Huber's view, strict notions of sovereignty
are entirely compatible with a (limited) obligation to enforce the rights cre-
ated by entities (such as other sovereigns) not within the direct reach of the
sovereign itself.
Huber was not the only historic figure in conflicts jurisprudence to
recognize this relationship between delegation and conflicts. Joseph Story
recognized the connection as well. Echoing Huber's first principle of inter-
national law, Story declared that
no state or nation can by its laws directly affect or bind property out of its own territory, or
bind persons not resident therein .... [F]or it would be wholly incompatible with the equal-
ity and exclusiveness of the sovereignty of all nations, that any one nation should be at lib-
erty to regulate either persons or things not within its own territory."
At the same time, Story recognized that a degree of international coopera-
tion was entirely consistent with his strict territorial model.45 In sum, early
conflicts scholars saw conflicts principles as the means by which to recon-
cile strict territorial-based notions of sovereignty and conceptions of comity
underpinning international law.46
The insights of the early conflicts scholars were not confined to the
annals of legal theory but influenced legal doctrine as well. For example,
early notions of personal jurisdiction were premised on strict principles of
territorial sovereignty.47 So too were notions of foreign sovereign immunity
prior to the emergence of the restrictive theory and, eventually, the adoption
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"). 4
Modem examples in conflicts-of-law reflect this insight too. For ex-
ample, principles governing enforcement of a foreign judgment echoed
Huber's third principle by explicitly citing Joseph Story's principle that a
court generally was obligated to recognize and enforce a foreign court's
43 LORENZEN, supra note 40, at 137.
44 STORY, supra note 39, § 20, at 20-21.
45 Seeid.§§ 18-19, at18-20.
46 EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 18-20 (4th ed. 2004). The treatment of state
laws and judgments similarly demonstrates how conflicts-of-law principles can help us to understand
the relationship between sovereignty and delegation. At bottom, the Full Faith and Credit Clause repre-
sents a form of delegation by the state governments to the federal constitutional authority that affects
both the states' jurisdiction to prescribe and their jurisdiction to adjudicate. Id. at 150. The states surren-
der the ability to derogate from each other's judgments in exchange for the benefits that come through
closer federal cooperation. Id. At the same time, the states retain residual control over the governing
legal rule in a given case through limits on their obligation to apply another state's law in their own
courts. Id.
47 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241,
276-77 (1808).
48 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 27, at 219-20.
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judgment unless the court concluded that it would undermine the interest of
the state or its citizens.49 Likewise, courts have repeatedly held that they
will attempt to construe language in a treaty in a manner consistent with the
reasonable interpretations of that same language by foreign courts in other
signatory nations." Here too, the United States court is surrendering a de-
gree of its adjudicative power by allowing foreign courts to influence its
own judicial inquiry.5
Of course, at least two features differentiate these cases from those at
the center of the delegation debate. For one thing, none of these examples
entail the creation of new supranational organizations, unlike, for example,
the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). For another thing, some of the
examples, such as the enforcement of foreign judgments, explicitly preserve
to the sovereign an ability to decline to give legal effect to the foreign sov-
ereign's act (such as refusing to enforce a foreign judgment on public pol-
icy grounds), whereas supranational organizations may not allow similar
derogations (such as the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention at
issue in Medellin or the elimination of judicial review of arbitration awards
rendered under the Washington Convention of 1965).52
These are however mere differences of degree, not of kind. As to the
first distinction, the creation of a new organization may influence both the
quality of the delegation and the cost-benefit calculus, but it is hardly an
essential prerequisite for something to qualify as a delegation. As to the
second distinction, many delegations (both organizational and non-
organizational), including controversial ones such as NAFTA or the WTO,
contain escape devices similar to the exceptions to the enforcement of for-
eign judgments.53 My aim here is not to demonstrate that enforcement of
foreign judgments and accession to international bodies are identical or
functionally equivalent (or that either is particularly desirable or undesir-
able). Rather, it is simply to show that conflicts-of-law principles offer a
useful lens through which to analyze the delegation debate. The writings of
49 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164-65, 189-91, 202-03, 227-28 (1895).
50 See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We
can, and should, look to decisions of other signatories when we interpret treaty provisions. Foreign
constructions are evidence of the original shared understanding of the contracting parties. Moreover, it is
reasonable to impute to the parties an intent that their respective courts strive to interpret the treaty
consistently.").
51 Indeed, the more recent emphasis on explicit interest analysis in conflicts of law makes clear
that courts routinely consider the interests of other sovereigns in deciding what rule to apply to a par-
ticular legal question before them. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 27, at 698-700.
52 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353-54 (2008). As we shall see in Part Ill, similar escape
devices exist in other types of delegations, including more controversial ones such as NAFTA, the
WTO, or the ICJ.
53 See generally WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
CLAUSE 20-22 (2005) (describing the general use of "escape devices" within a traditional system of
conflict of laws).
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Huber and Story, the early doctrines in areas like personal jurisdiction, and
more modem doctrines such as those governing enforcement of a foreign
judgment all embrace this notion. 4 Part II of this Essay builds on this ex-
panded definition and offers a novel typology by which to classify various
forms of delegation.
II. MODELING THE CONFLICTS-OF-LAW APPROACH
Part I explained how scholars have framed the current delegation de-
bate too narrowly. It defended a broadening of the term "delegation," one
that extends beyond simply the vesting of authority in international organi-
zations and, instead, should also include the sharing of legislative and judi-
cial jurisdiction with an institution not within the direct reach of the dele-
gating sovereign. Building on that definition, this Part constructs a typology
for analyzing such delegations. Part II.A reviews previous attempts to cate-
gorize delegations. Part II.B identifies and defends the salient characteris-
tics in the typology. Part II.C details the typology and offers concrete ex-
amples.
Organizational?
Yes No
Legislative Delegations To Organizations Non-Organizational
Whose Decisions Require Delegations of Legisla-
Domestication tive Jurisdiction
(Part I. C. 3) (Part I. C. 1)
Judicial Delegations To Organizations Non-Organizational
Whose Decisions Are Auto- Delegations of Judicial
matically Domesticated Jurisdiction
(Part I. C.4) (Part 11. C.2)
A. Literature Review
Early contributions to the current delegation debate tended to adopt a
fairly simplified approach ("the bipolar approach").5 That is, both defend-
ers and skeptics tended to treat all delegations, in whatever form, as a sin-
gular phenomenon, to be supported or opposed. 6 The bipolar approach to
54 See, e.g., STORY, supra note 40, § 550, at462-63; LoRENZEN,supra note 41, at 160-61.
55 For commentary exemplifying the bipolar approach, see, for example, Young, supra note 11, at
527, 529, 533; Heifer & Slaughter, supra note I1, at 386-87.
56 For exceptions, see Bradley & Kelley, supra note 4, at 2 (providing a more nuanced analysis of
delegation and the types of authority that can be granted).
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delegation offered simplicity, both a virtue and a drawback. As a virtue,
simplicity enabled the debate, in its early stages, to form around common
examples and common notions about its costs and benefits (explored in
more detail in Part III). As a drawback, simplicity caused both sides in the
delegation debate to fail to pay adequate attention to potentially important
differences in types of delegation.
More recent scholarship has recognized this inattention and sought to
provide a more nuanced account of delegation ("the multi-polar" approach).
As Edward Swaine explains, "not all international delegations are created
equal."57 Scholars employing the multi-polar approach have sought to cate-
gorize different types of delegation along various axes.58 For example, Rob-
ert Keohane and others have argued that we should consider a delegation
along three axes: independence, access, and embeddedness 9 An institu-
tion's location on this continuum will permit predictions about how the
institution operates. Keohane's article made an important contribution to
the delegation scholarship by demonstrating the importance of organiza-
tional behavior to an understanding of the delegation phenomenon.6" Yet,
by failing to focus on the nuanced legal distinctions between the different
types of delegated activity, the article left an important gap in the account.
Recent scholarship by Curtis Bradley and Judith Kelley help to fill that
gap.61 Bradley and Kelley propose an eight-part typology of delegated
authority.62 The types include legislative, adjudicative, monitoring and en-
forcement, regulatory, agenda-setting, research and advice, policy imple-
mentation, and re-delegation.63 The authors then explain how the grant of
authority to an organization will depend on the legal effect of its actions
57 Swaine, supra note 7, at 1604.
58 See, e.g., Keohane et al., supra note 11, at 458.
59 Independence "measures the extent to which adjudicators for an international authority ... are
able to deliberate and reach legal judgments independently of national governments." Id. at 459-60.
Similarly, "access measures the range of social and political actors who have legal standing to submit a
dispute to be resolved." Id. at 462. Embeddedness represents the degree to which the states implement
the international actor's decisions. Id. at 466.
60 Id. at 457, 488.
61 See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 4.
62 Given the emphasis that this Essay places on definitions, I should note that Bradley and Kelley
employ a narrower definition of delegation than I do here. They define delegation as "a grant of author-
ity by two or more states to an international body to make decisions or take actions." Bradley & Kelley,
supra note 4, at 2. 1 explain my disagreement with that definition supra note 7 and accompanying text.
63 This Essay formally defines these terms, Bradley & Kelley, supra note 4, at 10-17, most of
which are intuitive, so I do not repeat them here. The only one that might not be obvious to the informed
reader is "re-delegation," which consists of a decision by the international body to delegate authority to
another entity. Id. at 17. The authors cite as an example a decision by the World Health Organization or
the United Nations to subcontract various "in-country" tasks with non-governmental organizations or
for-profit corporations. Id.
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(such as the direct effect of judgments by the European Court of Justice')
and the extent to which member states can control the organization's inde-
pendence (such as the veto that a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council can exercise over a resolution).65
Bradley and Kelley's framework contributes to the delegation scholar-
ship in important ways. It employs the more nuanced approach characteris-
tic of the "multi-polar approach" and offers one of the first systematic at-
tempts to classify various forms of delegation.66 Unfortunately, their ap-
proach asserts, rather than derives, the particular classifications.67 That is to
say, the authors do not attempt to explain why the lines should be drawn
between, for example, monitoring delegations and policy implementation
delegations. Nor do they attempt to identify first-order criteria on which
delegations should be distinguished, however intuitively appealing those
criteria might be to the American-trained lawyer versed in separation-of-
powers principles. To be clear, this is not to say that the typology offered by
Bradley and Kelley is necessarily invalid.68 Rather, my point is simply that
the authors have not adequately justified their selection. The next subpart
fills this gap in Bradley and Kelley's work.
B. Deriving the Criteria
The preceding section explained the need for a more nuanced typology
in which to classify delegations and how the recent scholarship by Bradley
and Kelley advanced that quest. This section derives a set of criteria to in-
form the construction of the typology. In short, I defend the use of three
criteria: (a) the type of jurisdiction delegated, (b) whether the delegation
creates an organization, and (c) the extent to which that organization relies
on domestic actors to implement its decisions.
1. Legislative vs. Judicial Delegations
To begin to derive the relevant criteria, it is important to recall the
broad stakes in the debate-weighing an alleged loss of state sovereignty
and political accountability against the purported benefits from international
cooperation, including the advancement of certain international norms. On
64 The European Court of Justice routinely judges the compatibility of the domestic enactments of
member states with European law. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403,
2413-17, 2420-21 (1991).
65 Bradley & Kelley, supra note 4, at 17-20.
66 Id.atO-17.
67 For another recent critique of the Bradley & Kelley hypothesis, see Guzman & Landsidle, supra
note 10, at 1697-1701.
68 Indeed, as becomes apparent in Part II.C, I agree with their classifications in part.
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the cost side, the degree of any claimed loss of sovereignty will depend on
the nature of the transfer. Crafting legislative rules and making judicial de-
terminations about scope of subject matter jurisdiction entail different sov-
ereignty costs and accountability problems. For example, very different
considerations influence, on one hand, the drafting of a securities law to
prevent insider trading and, on the other hand, an inquiry by a court
whether or not a particular trade falls within its jurisdiction.
Conflicts-of-law principles support this distinction. Conflicts scholars
differentiate between legislative jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction.69 Leg-
islative jurisdiction, sometimes referred to as prescriptive jurisdiction, con-
cerns the power of the sovereign to make its law applicable to certain per-
sons or activities.7" A classic example is the power of Congress to apply its
statutes extraterritorially.7" By contrast, judicial jurisdiction concerns the
power of a court to decide a particular case.72 These two concepts provide a
rough measure for capturing the difference between the two types of dele-
gation (legislative vs. adjudicatory) described in the preceding paragraph.
Thus, they can supply a first classificatory criterion.
By defending this distinction, I do not mean to suggest that all forms
of legislative delegation necessarily entail greater sovereignty costs than all
forms of judicial delegation. A judicial delegation that significantly ties the
hands of a sovereign could obviously work significant sovereignty costs.
Rather, my point here is simply to illustrate that there is a principled quali-
tative difference between the two forms of delegation that justifies their
separate treatment in the typology.
2. Organizational vs. Non-Organizational Delegation
A typology that simply distinguished between legislative and adjudica-
tive jurisdiction would fail to capture some of the important and evident
dynamics in the delegation debate. Specifically, it overlooks the importance
of organizational behavior in the dynamics of the delegation. Consequently,
the presence or absence of an organization should supply a second criterion
for classifying particular delegations.
Political science teaches us why this is the case. The creation of an or-
ganization entails certain principle-agent dynamics absent in a non-
organizational delegation. In the specific context of international delega-
69 For a discussion of the relationship between legislative and judicial jurisdiction in the context of
an international case, see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 812-15 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
70 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 60 (1934); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 401-02 (1987).
71 See Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 621-23 (1927).
72 RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(b) (1987).
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tions, as Keohane has demonstrated, the dynamics of an organization criti-
cally influence the nature of a delegation.73 Organizations, like any bureauc-
racy, are more prone to mission creep and may seek to expand their juris-
dictional mandate over time.74 Moreover, more "independent" organizations
may be able to extract greater "sovereignty costs" from the delegating states
(and achieve correspondingly more benefits through cooperation and norms
advancement). 75 By contrast, delegations that do not entail the creation of
an organization, but instead adhere to norms or conventions, create fewer
opportunities for mission creep and defection. 76
Here, it might be argued that the emphasis on organization in the
model is inconsistent with the definition of delegation developed in Part I. I
believe that the two arguments are in fact consistent. While the expanded
definition of delegation derived in Part I explained that a delegation did not
necessarily have to entail the creation of a new organization, it did not sug-
gest that the creation of an organization was irrelevant to the analysis.
3. Automatic Domestication vs. Non-Automatic Domestication 7
To this point, we have derived criteria to guide the classification of a
given delegation: the type of jurisdiction delegated and whether the delega-
tion creates an organization. Both theory and practice suggest that one final
differentiation is necessary: between delegations to organizations whose
decisions are automatically domesticated and those whose decisions are not.
The principle of direct effect provides the most obvious example of this
phenomenon and will be familiar to students of European law. At bottom,
under that doctrine, an organization's decisions have effect within a sover-
eign's territory without the need for implementation or other action by the
sovereign's own domestic organizations.78 Thus, for example, decisions of
the European Court of Justice and directives of the European Commission
have direct effect within the territories of member states irrespective of the
actions of those states' bureaucracies.79
73 See Keohane, supra note 11, at 479-87.
74 Opportunities for mission creep will depend on, among other things, the degree of specificity in
the scope of the delegation. See Ku, supra note 11, at 125-26. A precisely defined mandate reduces the
opportunity for an organization to overstep its mandate. See id. By contrast, vague and flowery man-
dates that fail to demarcate clear boundaries enhance the risk of creep and accentuate the need for es-
cape devices. See id.
71 See id.
76 See id.
77 While this concept is also referenced with the term of art, "self-execution," this Essay utilizes
automatic domestication. Self-execution is used in the treaty context, while this Essay discusses other
foreign laws that are automatically domesticated and are not self-executing in the traditional sense.
78 Keohane, supra note 11, at 467-68, 481-83.
79 Weiler, supra note 64, at 2413-17, 2420.
[VOL. 17:1
MEDELLIN, DELEGATION AND CONFLICTS (OF LAW)
The treatment of a delegated decision within a sovereign's domestic
legal system deserves separate legal treatment due to the different impact of
escape devices. By escape devices, I mean any mechanism whereby a sov-
ereign can block the delegated decision from having legal effect within its
territory.8" Examples of such devices abound. One familiar type of device is
"RUDs" (which stands for "Reservations, Understandings and Declara-
tions," statements that states deposit at the time they sign or ratify a
treaty).8 RUDs are well accepted in international law and their use is a cus-
tomary practice exemplified by section 2 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.82 Another example includes the use of a veto power; in
certain bodies, states can exercise a veto to block a particular exercise of
legislative jurisdiction by the transnational institution (such as the power
enjoyed by permanent members of the United Nations Security Council).83
States can withdraw from treaties, as the United States recently did with
respect to the International Criminal Court or the Optional Protocol in the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.84 Other escape devices include
public policy exceptions to the enforcement of arbitration awards and for-
eign judgments, interpretive canons, and last-in-time principles for stat-
utes.85
Automatic domestication reduces the opportunity for exit or, at a
minimum, increases the costs to the sovereign where the sovereign chooses
to withdraw from the treaty. Medellin v. Texas 6 demonstrates the stakes. If
the Supreme Court had held that judgments of the ICJ pursuant to the Vi-
enna Convention Optional Protocol were directly enforceable in the United
States, that would have worked a substantial inroad into the ability of
United States Courts to determine the meaning of treaties. Conversely, ad-
vocates of delegation would argue that direct effect promotes the "em-
beddedness" of an international organization's decisions (the degree to
which they seep into the legal fabric of sovereign states). Thus, the presence
80 See generally REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 53, at 20-22.
81 Hathaway, supra note 14, at 126 n.36.
82 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 19-23, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (providing for reservations in treaties).
83 U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
84 See Laurence R. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1583, 1628 (2005); Edward T.
Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2061-63 (2003); Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y
of State for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., to Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y Gen. (May 6, 2002), available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/05/06/court.letter.text/index.html; Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S.
Sec'y of State, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y Gen. (March 7, 2005), available at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=111-8&chapter-3&lang=en.
85 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 27, at 16 (explaining that the "last-in-time principle" holds
that "a federal statute supersedes prior inconsistent treaties, and conversely, a treaty supersedes prior
inconsistent federal statutes"); Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution,
and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1561-62, 1587-95 (2003); Paul Schiff Berman, The
Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 522 (2002).
86 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
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or absence of this condition has a meaningful impact on the extent to which
a delegation implicates the core concerns in the delegation debate. Accord-
ingly, it is appropriate to include it as a criterion in the typology. s7
This section has derived three criteria to guide the classification of in-
ternational delegations: the type of jurisdiction delegated, whether the dele-
gation creates an organization, and the effect of that organization's actions
in the sovereign state's domestic legal sphere. The next section uses these
criteria to construct a typology for analyzing delegations.
C. Constructing the Typology
The preceding section defended a list of factors that should guide the
construction of a typology for evaluating delegations. This section con-
structs the typology. Using those criteria and the broadened definition of
delegation developed in Part I, I offer a four-part typology here.
1. Non-Organizational Delegations of Legislative Jurisdiction
At one end of the delegation spectrum lie treaties that merely set a
choice-of-law rule. The 2006 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary ("Hague
Securities Convention") provides a good example.8" The Hague Securities
Convention, which both the United States and Switzerland have signed (and
several other countries plus the European Union are presently considering),
regulates the applicable law in cross-border securities transactions. 9 In
grossly oversimplified terms, the Convention provides that, if the parties
have designated the governing law in their agreement, their chosen law
87 The recent American Society of International Law ("ASIL")/ABA report on Medellin supports
this emphasis on domestication as a critical feature of an international law obligation. See AM. SOC'Y OF
INT'L LAW, ABA/ASIL JOINT TASK FORCE ON TREATIES IN U.S. LAW 10-12 (2009),
www.asil.org/files/TreatiesTaskForceReport.pdf.
88 Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an
Intermediary, U.S.-Switz., July 5, 2006, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act-
conventions.pdf&cid=72 [hereinafter Hague Securities Convention]. Other examples include
assimilative laws and customary international law. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. Like
the Hague Securities Convention, supra, each of these examples delegates a degree of legislative
jurisdiction to external institutions without affecting judicial jurisdiction and without creating a new
organizational entity.
89 For commentary, see Chris Kentouris, International Treaty Provides Conflict-of-Interest Guid-
ance: U.S. and Switzerland First to Sign G30-Backed Hague Securities Convention, SEC. INDUSTRY
NEWS, July 24, 2006, at I, available at http://www.securitiesindustry.com/issues/20060723/18061-
I .html?zk; Kate Laughlin, Regulation: Hague Plan Moves for Global Securities Laws, HIGH YIELD
REPORT, July 17, 2006; Financial Markets: Member States Invited to Sign the Hague Securities Con-
vention, EUROPOLITICS, July 6, 2006.
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generally will apply.9 ° If the parties have not specified the governing law,
the Convention sets forth a series of tests, built on conflicts principles, to
determine the applicable law.9
Applying the criteria set forth in the preceding subsection, the Hague
Securities Convention represents a particularly modest delegation. It dele-
gates a degree of legislative jurisdiction to external actors (either the parties
or, lacking specification on their part, the country whose law applies under
the fallback tests in Article 5 such as the "qualifying office" test to deter-
mine the applicable law), allowing them to determine the applicable sub-
stantive law to matters falling under the Convention.92 It does not delegate
any judicial jurisdiction.93 Nor does it entail the creation of any new organi-
zational bureaucracy to oversee the Convention's implementation; rather, it
relies on existing domestic institutions to enforce its rules.94
One might argue that this type of international activity does not in-
volve delegation at all. Rather, it could simply represent a sort of inter-state
coordination, not unlike coordination among members of a society who
agree to drive on one side of the road. Under these circumstances, the coor-
dinating members are simply yielding the benefits of cooperation, not sur-
rendering some jurisdictional power.
While I acknowledge this argument has some force, I ultimately think
agreements of this sort are properly classified as delegations, albeit at a low
level. In the case of an inter-state treaty regulating choice of law, the states
still are surrendering a degree of legislative jurisdiction, for a foreign
authority is articulating a rule that will potentially regulate the behavior of a
United States entity. Here, one might differentiate between a case where the
sovereigns agree on a uniform rule such as the Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (which more closely resembles a coordination action)
and a case where one sovereign agrees to apply the rule of another sover-
eign without advance notice of its content.95
90 Hague Securities Convention, supra note 88, art. 4. The Convention still requires that the rele-
vant intermediary satisfy a "qualifying office" test set forth in Article 4. Id.; see also Hague Conference
on Private Int'l Law, The Hague Securities Convention: A Modem and Global Conflict of Laws Regime
for Transactions Involving Securities Held with an Intermediary I (Dec. 2006), http://www.hcch.net/
upload/outline36e.pdf [hereinafter Hague Securities Convention Outline].
91 Hague Securities Convention, supra note 88, art. 5.
92 Id. arts. 4-5; Hague Securities Convention Outline, supra note 88, at I.
93 Hague Securities Convention Outline, supra note 88, at 1-2.
94 id.
95 I considered but ultimately rejected a separate categorization of "executive" delegations, a
concept that has received some support in the literature. See John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the
Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 87, 115-19 (1998); Bradley & Kelley, supra note 4, at 5, 35. The paradigmatic example here
is the Chemical Weapons Convention. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13,
1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45. While that convention does involve an authorization to executive officers of an
intergovernmental organization, id. art. VIII.C, I did not think that sort of example warranted a separate
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2. Non-Organizational Delegations of Judicial Jurisdiction
Slightly further down the spectrum come treaties that contain choice-
of-law rules and channel judicial jurisdiction to courts in particular coun-
tries.96 The New York Convention again provides a good example. Signed
by over 140 nations, the New York Convention sets forth a framework to
promote the enforcement of international arbitration agreements and arbitral
awards.97 It provides that courts in signatory countries generally must en-
force arbitration agreements (that satisfy certain prerequisites).98 This en-
forcement obligation is subject to a limited exception for agreements that
are "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed,"99 a stan-
dard that is narrower than the grounds for non-enforcement under most
national arbitral laws.'00 In this respect, the New York Convention delegates
a degree of legislative jurisdiction (that is, ceding control over the grounds
for declaring unenforceable an international arbitration agreement).
The New York Convention's provisions on the enforcement of awards
also channel a degree of judicial jurisdiction. For example, Article V(1)(e)
permits non-recognition where the award has been set aside "by a compe-
tent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award
was made." '' This ground links the behavior of the enforcement forum's
courts to actions by a foreign forum's courts. °2 In this respect, Article
V(1)(e) of the New York Convention represents a qualitatively different
delegation from the kinds considered so far. Yet like the Convention's other
provisions and the Hague Securities Convention, it relies on domestic judi-
classification for two reasons. First, executive delegations of that sort often accompany legislative
delegations, as in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, so the executive delegation is ulti-
mately derivative. Second, to the extent the legislative delegation involves the creation of a bureaucracy
such as an entity enforcing the treaty obligations, my idea of organizational versus non-organizational
delegations captures the distinction and enables one to draw on the literature about bureaucracy behavior
to highlight the effects of the delegation.
96 For a discussion of the relationship between domestic tribunals and supranational ones, see
generally Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference,
43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675 passim (2003).
97 New York Convention, supra note 29, art. 1.
9' Id. art. II.
99 Id. art. 11(3).
100 Compare id., with Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
101 New York Convention, supra note 29, art. V(I)(e).
102 Other examples of this sort of delegation include the recently signed Hague Convention on
Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, and the law governing enforcement of
foreign judgments. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895); AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE passim
(2006) [hereinafter RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT DRAFT]; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4
(2005) [hereinafter UNIFORM MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT].
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cial institutions, rather than a new transnational bureaucracy, to enforce its
rules. 13
3. Delegations To Organizations Whose Decisions Require Domes-
tication
Further down the spectrum are delegations that actually entail the crea-
tion of a new organization (here we begin a discussion of the delegations
envisioned in the "orthodox view" described in Part I). The preceding sub-
section explained the need to differentiate between those organizations
whose decisions had an automatic domestic effect and those whose deci-
sions did not. International law is replete with examples of delegations to
organizations whose decisions lack automatic domestic effect. The Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal provides a good example."° That tribunal,
created under the Algiers Accord, sought to provide an exclusive forum for
claims by U.S. and Iranian nationals arising out of the Iranian hostage crisis
and the subsequent freezing of Iranian assets by the United States." 5 Dis-
putes are resolved through arbitration rather than domestic courts.' 0 6 In de-
termining the applicable law, the Algiers Accord's Claims Settlement Dec-
laration directs arbitrators to "apply[] such choice of law rules and princi-
ples of commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to be
applicable."'0 7 The tribunal's decisions have the force of arbitral awards. 108
Several features of this system are relevant to the delegation analysis.
First, the signatories to the Algiers Accord are delegating both legislative
jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction. They are delegating legislative juris-
diction because international law, rather than domestic law, supplies the
applicable rule of decision. They are delegating judicial jurisdiction because
103 See also Young, supra note 29, at 479 ("[T]he enforcement of a judgment, without more, typi-
cally settles the dispute between the parties without resolving the rights of parties not before the court.
Particularly where the parties have already consented to the arbitral forum, there are few sovereign
concerns to outweigh the efficiency gains to be had from barring relitigation.").
104 See CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL 238-41 (1998). Also note, in the case of the Algiers Accord, the arbitration proceedings had
the force of President Carter's actions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. See
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662-63 (1981). However, this case is still not distinguishable
because the presence of arbitration proceedings usually means that the resulting decisions have the force
of arbitral awards.
105 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19,
1981, 81 DEP'T STATE BULL., Feb. 1981, at 1-2, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 224.
106 id.
107 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning
the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran art. V, Jan. 19, 1981, 81 DEP'T STATE BULL., Feb. 1981, at 3-4, reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 230, 232 [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration].
108 Id. art. IV.
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the Accords' tribunals, rather than domestic courts, are determining liability
in a given case. Notably, however, the delegation does not flow in one di-
rection-the Algiers Accord does not create an independent body to prom-
ulgate liability rules-instead, it delegates those rules to those "institutions"
involved in the development of "principles of commercial and international
law."'0 9 By contrast, the judicial jurisdiction is vested in the Tribunal it-
self." Thus, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal example teaches us that one
method of managing the costs and benefits of delegation is to spread the
jurisdictional grant across multiple institutions."'
The second noteworthy feature of the delegation here is that the deci-
sions of the Claims Tribunal still rely on the cooperation of domestic im-
plementing institutions for legal effect. As arbitral awards, they are not
automatically reduced to domestic judgment but, instead, must undergo
confirmation, recognition and/or enforcement through the domestic courts
and are subject to the signatory states' arbitration laws."2 This preserves to
the states a degree of control over how the delegation in fact affects the
states' domestic legal regime.
Disputes under the North American Free Trade Agreement" 3 also ar-
guably fall within this category. NAFTA obligated member states to re-
move various restrictions on trade and created an arbitration mechanism,
dispute resolution boards ("DRBs"), to resolve disputes either between
member states or between private parties and member states over whether
particular conduct (such as dumping or countervailing duties) violated the
treaty.' 14 Arbitrators are chosen from national lists maintained by member
109 Id. art. V.
"10 ld. art. II.
111 One may object that the distinction offered here is hypertechnical. While the Algiers Accord
does not formally vest the authority to determine the applicable liability rule to the tribunals, in practice
the tribunals themselves are performing something akin to this function in the course of ascertaining
what they believe to be the applicable conflicts principles and the relevant principles of commercial and
international law. The criticism is valid but incomplete. First, it does not really affect the theoretical
opportunity to spread the power of a delegation across multiple institutions. Second, it presumes that
tribunals vested with this power to ascertain the applicable principles will exercise it in a self-
aggrandizing rather than intellectually honest way. As Heifer and Slaughter have explained in the con-
text of the European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights, the behavior of such trans-
national institutions suggests that they behave more modestly. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note II, at
314-17.
112 Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 107, art. IV(3).
113 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993);
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. ch. 21 (2006) [hereinafter
NAFTA Implementation Act].
114 See Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of Binational Arbitral
Review Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1455, 1459-
62 (1992); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the
United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 766-68 (2004); Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Suprana-
tional Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 835 (2007).
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states."5 They resolve the disputes according to the law that they determine
applicable by reference to international conflicts principles set forth in the
treaty." 6 The decisions of the arbitral panel are binding and largely immune
from review in the domestic courts of the member states." 17
NAFTA DRBs display many of the same characteristics as the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal. The signatory states are delegating a degree of legis-
lative jurisdiction (letting international conflicts principles determine the
substantive law). They also are delegating judicial jurisdiction (allowing the
transnational tribunals to resolve the dispute largely to the exclusion of do-
mestic institutions). They create new institutions (the boards).
It is, perhaps, an open question how far the DRBs' decisions rely on
domestic institutions for implementation. By and large, this has not been
tested, for parties largely comply with DRB decisions, and a fallback
mechanism in the NAFTA implementing legislation provides that the
President via executive order can adopt a DRB decision as his own (not
unlike the President's strategy in Medellin)."8 This issue did spill out-
albeit inconclusively-in the recent Canadian softwood lumber dispute."9
In that dispute, which ultimately settled, a NAFTA DRB issued an order
which seemingly mandated that the Department of Commerce eliminate 16
percent of their duties on Canadian lumber imports. 2° The implication was
that the dispute resolution boards had the authority to issue orders to the
U.S. Department of Commerce without any intervening action by the Ex-
ecutive Branch. Subsequent litigation will be necessary to test whether such
an order exceeded the DRB's jurisdiction.
4. Delegations To Organizations Whose Decisions are Automati-
cally Domesticated
At the far end of the spectrum lie delegations of jurisdiction to institu-
tions that do not rely on domestic agents for implementation of their deci-
sions. 2 ' Few, if any, examples truly exist. Among the most often-cited are
115 Chen, supra note 114, at 146 1.
116 Pfander, supra note 114, at 768 ("[NAFTA panels] apply the law of the United States only as
provided in the Agreement itself and otherwise look to an evolving body of international principles that
govern fair investor treatment.").
117 Chen, supra note 114, at 1461-62 (describing the effect of arbitral review under NAFTA).
118 NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 113, 19 U.S.C. § 3314.
119 John R. Crook, Commerce Department Acts to Comply with NAFTA Panel Instructions in
Softwood Lumber Case, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 242,242-43 (2008).
120 Matthew Daly, NAFTA Panel Gives U.S. One Week to Cut Softwood Lumber Duties, TRADE
OBSERVATORY, Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.tradeobservatory.org/headlines.cfm?reflD=77554.
121 Here, one might posit a distinction between international delegations (where the decisions of
the body have effect but only at the level of international law) and domestic delegations (where the
decisions of the international body have direct effect without further domestication by the sovereign).
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the institutions of the European Community.'22 In broad terms, the various
member states through several treaties, most notably the Treaty of Rome
and the Treaty of Maastricht, have delegated both legislative and judicial
jurisdiction to several transnational institutions, including the European
Commission ("EC"), the European Parliament, and the European Court of
Justice.'23 Various acts of these institutions, most notably the directives of
the European Commission, have "direct effect" in the territories of the
member states.'24 In other words, the Commission's directives apply with-
out further action, whether executive, legislative, or judicial in the member
states.25
As to the European Community, there is of course a gap between the
legal theory and the actual practice, which dampens somewhat the plausi-
bility of this account. While it certainly is true, as a legal matter, that EC
directives have direct effect in member nations, the European institutions
still rely on the domestic institutions of those member nations to implement
those directives within the Member States.'26 As some have noted, this re-
sidual reliance on domestic institutions, even following the pronouncement
of the direct effect doctrine, has the potential to constrain the European
institutions from overreaching.'27
The Medellin case demonstrates how the line between a transnational
bureaucracy that relies on domestic actors and one that does not can be-
come blurred. Originally, the International Court of Justice was created in
conjunction with the United Nations as a vehicle for resolving disputes be-
tween states.'28 Over time, it has taken on new roles, including jurisdiction
over disputes under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations pursuant
to an Optional Protocol which the United States originally signed (and from
which it subsequently withdrew).' 29 If the Supreme Court had concluded in
Medellin that ICJ judgments had an automatic domestic effect in the United
States, that decision would require us to classify it along with European
Community directives, a topic to which I return in Part III.C.
The former case might be treated as simply a weaker form of the delegation I describe here. See Young,
supra note 29, at 509-10.
122 See Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 10, at 1694-96; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 11, at
290-98.
123 T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW passim (5th ed. 2003).
124 See Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, Francovich, Bonifaci v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357,
7-8 (citing Case C-221/88, European Coal & Steel Cmty. v. Acciaierie e ferriere Busseni S.p.A.,
1990 E.C.R. 1-495, 22).
125 See id. 7.
126 Weiler, supra note 64, at 2420-22.
127 See id. at 2406 n.7; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 1I, at 315.
128 See ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: 1946-1996, at 145 (1996).
129 The expansion in the ICJ's mandate perhaps exemplifies the mission creep mentioned earlier
and justifies organizational creation as one criterion in the typology.
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In sum, this Part has reviewed the existing classifications of delega-
tion, defended a multi-polar approach to the question, built on some of the
weaknesses in the account offered by Bradley and Kelley, derived three
salient criteria, and constructed a four-part typology based on those criteria.
The next Part utilizes that typology to engage in some preliminary norma-
tive analysis about specific delegations.
III. APPLYING THE TYPOLOGY: THE NORMATIVE DEBATE
This Part ties together the analysis and proceeds in three subparts. The
first subpart offers a normative tool for evaluating the costs and benefits of
delegation. The second subpart then applies this tool to examples of specific
delegations classified according to the typology developed in Part II. The
last subpart discusses the lessons of this normative framework for the
Medellin case.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Delegation
The normative debate over delegations, generally speaking, is well
worn, and I do not rehash it here. Rather, I synthesize and refine the domi-
nant views in the literature.
1. Benefits of Delegation
While scholars have categorized them in various ways, the benefits of
delegation basically fall into three categories. First, delegation enables
states to achieve through cooperation goals that they could not achieve act-
ing through unilateral action (in more theoretical terms, delegation over-
comes a collective action problem).13 For example, accession to NAFTA or
the WTO enables a country to achieve certain trade benefits with the
awareness that other nations who have ratified the treaty will abide by its
provisions, due in part to the mutual ability of all signatory nations to en-
sure compliance.
130 See Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 10, at 1693-94; Hatha-way, supra note 14, at 137. At a
slightly more nuanced level, we might subdivide the "collective action" benefits into five subcatego-
ies-it facilitates collective decision-making; it creates policy bias; it provides a less costly mechanism
for resolving disputes; it provides a mechanism for managing policy externalities; and finally, over time,
it provides opportunities to enhance the credibility of international commitments. See Hawkins, supra
note 15, at 13-23.
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Second, delegation advances certain norms such as human rights-
norms that states, for whatever reason, might seek to impede.' For exam-
ple, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights embraces cer-
tain norms such as the right to compensation for an "unlawful arrest or de-
tention." '
Third, delegation offers efficiencies through division of labor and
gains from specialization.'33 In other words, states create an organizational
mechanism that assumes responsibility for a particular task and, in the
course of doing so, develop a superior expertise in a given area. The Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") provides a good example. Cre-
ated as an independent agency in 1957 and reporting to (though independ-
ent from) the United Nations General Assembly, the IAEA's overarching
function is to pursue "safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear science and
technology."'34 To fulfill this mandate, it performs three main tasks. It in-
spects existing nuclear facilities to ensure that they are using technology for
peaceful purposes; it supplies technical information to ensure the safety of
nuclear facilities; and it serves as a clearinghouse for scientific research into
the safe uses of nuclear technology.'35 Through these functions, the IAEA
relieves states of the need to undertake some of the functions themselves
and develops an unparalleled expertise in nuclear technology.'36
2. Costs of Delegation
As with the benefits, skeptics of delegation have offered different ac-
counts of its costs,' but they too basically boil down to three points. First,
131 Hathaway, supra note 14, at 145-48. In more abstract terms, delegation as an institutional
matter promotes a certain "policy bias" that is less likely to be obtained in a purely statist setting. Haw-
kins, supra note 15, at 13, 19-20.
132 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(5), opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
133 Hawkinsetal.,supra note 15, at 13-15.
134 Our Work: Work at the IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/index.html (last visited Sept. 25,
2009).
135 Id.
136 Of course, it should be noted that in certain circumstances states may actually prefer redundant
capabilities, even if they are inefficient. For one thing, there may be circumstances where the agency's
interests diverge from the delegating state's. For another thing, the state may wish to preserve an inde-
pendent means (and the consequent expertise) to verify claims by the independent agency. These coun-
tervailing considerations may dampen the efficiency gains that come from the division of labor and the
specialization with the international agency.
137 Bradley & Kelley supra note 4, at 27-32 (suggesting diminished autonomy, unwanted conces-
sions, increased costs for noncompliance with international commitment, and lost opportunity costs as
downsides to delegation); Hathaway, supra note 14, at 120-40 (suggesting consenting authority, time-
inconsistent preferences, unintended consequences, and asymmetric power as costs of delegation).
[VOL. 17:1
MEDELLIN, DELEGATION AND CONFLICTS (OF LAW)
the most often cited one is "sovereignty costs."'3 8 While the value of that
term is debatable, it essentially captures the idea that, through the grant of
authority, a nation is surrendering some bit of its "sovereignty" over a par-
ticular issue.'39 Transnational institutions, unlike domestic political institu-
tions, are not politically accountable to an electorate and, therefore, may be
less responsive to the needs of a citizenry."a This lack of political account-
ability for their actions, according to the sovereignty costs argument, com-
promises the legitimacy of the transnational organization's actions. "'
Second, delegation may require the sovereign to agree on a second-
best solution or to subject itself to a sanctioning or monitoring mechanism
in order to achieve a necessary compromise with its treaty partners.'42 Ac-
cording to this argument, states' choices reflect a series of preference order-
ing, and when acting unilaterally, states can more easily choose to pursue
the choice that optimizes their interest.'43 By contrast, when acting coopera-
tively, states sometimes must pursue courses other than the optimal one in
order to satisfy the competing needs of their treaty partner. "'
Finally, though not noted in the literature, an additional cost of delega-
tion is the risk of defection. This risk is often captured in various forms of
the prisoner's dilemma.'45 For example, suppose that by acting autono-
mously, two individuals can obtain a payoff of "2." Suppose further that by
cooperating they can obtain a payoff of "3." But if one cooperates and the
other defects, then the cooperator only obtains a payoff of "1" while the
defector obtains a payoff of "4." In that case, delegation might put the sov-
ereign in a worse position than if it had not cooperated in the first place. In
138 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT'L ORG. 421,436-41 (2000).
139 Bradley & Kelley, supra note 4, at 27-28.
140 A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J INT'L L. 877, 937
(2000).
141 Id.; Ku, supra note 11, at 124.
142 Bradley & Kelley, supra note 4, at 28. One may legitimately question whether either of these
represents a cost at all. The answer depends both on the intensity of the state's preference and the likely
result in case of non-cooperation. For example, suppose that a country accedes to a treaty that generates
net $x in export flows but requires it to make concession that reduce economic output by $y; in this case
accession to the treaty only would entail a "cost" if $y>$x. Similarly if the economic impact of a treaty's
sanctioning mechanism is represented by $a and the net export flows by $b, then the monitoring mecha-
nism only represents a "cost" if$a > $b.
143 See id.
144 Id. Defenders of delegation naturally respond that this critique presents a false dilemma. See
Hathaway, supra note 14, at 140-41. In their view, delegations and cooperation create opportunities not
available to states acting atomistically. Id. Thereby, the delegation increases the state's aggregate wealth
even if the state must pursue a suboptimal strategy with respect to one or more particular decisions. See
id. at 141-42.
145 T. Bums & L.D. Meeker, Structural Properties and Resolutions of the Prisoners' Dilemma
Game, in GAME THEORY AS A THEORY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 35, 35-36 (Anatol Rapoport ed.,
1974). See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 22-36 (2d ed. 1971).
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other words, the risks of defection mean that the benefits of cooperation can
be overstated.
3. Does Consent Supply the Missing Link?
A recent article by Oona Hathaway has cast doubt on some of the cost
arguments and submits that notions of "consent" supply a missing link in
the defense of delegation.'46 Hathaway argues that delegation skeptics over-
look the significance of state "consent" to the delegation.'4 7 In other words,
by acceding to a treaty such as NAFTA, states voluntarily assume the obli-
gations and voluntarily cede the authority to the international organization.
This consent reduces sovereignty costs both because the sovereign has will-
ingly chosen to assume the obligation and also perhaps because the sover-
eign has calculated that the benefits from cooperation exceed the costs.'48
While Hathaway's article fills an important gap in the theoretical de-
bate, it does not supply a fully satisfying answer to the costs of delegation.
Hathaway's argument overlooks the fact that an international organization's
mandate is vague and ill-defined. As Keohane et al. have explained, such
conditions enhance the risk that the international organization will seek to
expand the scope of its mandate beyond that envisioned by the sovereign
when it consented to the delegation. 1"' One example is when the arbitral
panel in the Canadian Softwood Lumber case actually ordered the Depart-
ment of Commerce to lower its countervailing duties. ° Such expansions in
scope can then entail an added and unforeseen loss of sovereignty.
Moreover, the consent argument turns on a normative consideration
about the degree of consent necessary to legitimize a delegation. Defenders
of delegation such as Hathaway appear to argue that consent to process
suffices. In other words, by opting into a treaty that contains a dispute reso-
lution mechanism, a state knows that it is consenting to a degree of uncer-
tainty about how that dispute resolution mechanism is going to be imple-
mented. Skeptics of international delegation appear to argue that consent to
process does not suffice; rather, there must be consent to the outcome of the
international institution's decision. Escape devices, such as public policy
exceptions or RUDs, provide an imperfect opportunity for a state to engage
in this type of outcome-based consent. 5 '
146 Hathaway, supra note 14, at 121-22.
147 Id.
148 Seeid. at 121-22, 125-27.
149 Keohane et al., supra note 11, at 461-62, 481-82.
150 Crook, supra note 119, at 242-43.
151 I say imperfect because I believe that the use of these escape devices is not costless. It may
undermine the "embeddedness" of the international institution's decisions and, thereby, undermine the
institution's ability to engage in other acts that advance the sovereign's interests.
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To summarize, delegations offer three main benefits: (1) cooperation,
(2) norms advancement, and (3) efficiency gains from specialization. They
also entail several costs: (1) sovereignty costs, (2) second-best outcomes,
and (3) risks of defection. Notions of consent supply an important consid-
eration in the analysis but cannot completely address the potentially signifi-
cant costs in a particular delegation. Part III.B applies those normative tools
to particular types of delegation.
B. Considering Costs and Benefits in Light of the Typology
This Part provides several preliminary applications of the theory. It
considers the theoretical costs and benefits of delegations using the typol-
ogy developed in Part II. By doing so, I hope to provide a richer account of
what types of delegations are more likely to yield net benefits.
1. Non-Organizational Delegations of Legislative Jurisdiction
With respect to this first category of delegations, the benefits are easily
realized and the costs minor. Consider again the Hague Securities Conven-
tion. Such choice-of-law conventions yield cooperative benefits: they pro-
vide greater clarity and, consequently, greater predictability to the securities
market. They also potentially advance a second benefit of delegation, norms
development; to the extent one believes that efficient capital markets are a
desirable end, treaties such as these that eliminate uncertainty engendered
by conflicts-of-law analysis advance that end. As to the third potential
benefit of delegation (efficiency gains from specialization), choice-of-law
treaties by their very nature generally do not advance this interest, for they
continue to rely on multiple domestic political organizations for their im-
plementation. In at least one respect, however, the Hague Securities Con-
vention indirectly advances this goal. By specifying that signatory countries
have regard for "the need to promote uniformity in . . .application,"' the
treaty promotes a degree of transnational legal harmonization that, over
time, may reduce the differences between domestic laws on the subject and
create the conditions for the emergence of a transnational organization. In
sum, benefits of such delegations are substantial.
Costs, by contrast, are minimal. Sovereignty costs are nominal: the
sovereign still retains full judicial jurisdiction over the case and merely has
surrendered marginal control over the applicable choice-of-law rule to the
extent a foreign state might supply the applicable liability rule (either by
operation of contract or by operation of the qualifying office test). There is
at best a slight risk of forcing the states to settle for second-best outcomes
152 Hague Securities Convention, supra note 88, art. 13.
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(the optimal outcome, I suppose, would be a choice-of-law test that opti-
mized the sovereign's interests and, presumably, those corporate entities
within its jurisdiction). Finally, risks of defection also are slight. To the
extent the treaty merely ensures the enforceability of the party's choice-of-
law clause, any defection (such as a refusal to enforce the clause) would be
highly visible.153 To the extent parties do not specify the governing law,
risks of defection rise (courts might misapply the "qualifying office" test).
2. Non-Organizational Delegations of Judicial Jurisdiction
Delegations of judicial jurisdiction entail a more complex mix of costs
and benefits than delegations of legislative jurisdiction. On the benefit side,
the analysis is substantially similar. Treaties such as the New York Conven-
tion and the Hague Choice of Courts Convention offer similar benefits from
cooperation, mostly through improved capital flows stimulated by greater
certainty over the enforceability of a decision resolving disputes. Likewise,
they offer the chance to advance certain norms-whether described as fa-
cilitating foreign commerce or promoting international comity. Benefits
from efficiency gains are again minimal due to the reliance on domestic
actors-here courts-to implement the treaties.
The cost analysis mirrors that with respect to non-organizational dele-
gations of legislative jurisdiction-with one major exception. Delegations
of this sort do carry a greater risk of defection. For example, although both
the United States and India are signatories to the New York Convention,
U.S. courts generally are more willing to enforce foreign arbitral awards
rendered in India than Indian courts are to enforce awards rendered in the
United States.'54
Here, escape devices such as reciprocity can mitigate the risk of defec-
tion. Structuring a reciprocity provision so as to link one sovereign's execu-
tion of its obligation to another sovereign's willingness to do likewise pe-
nalizes the defecting sovereign after its first move. In this sense, it closely
resembles the "Tit-for-Tat" strategy identified by Robert Axelrod as the
optimal solution to the prisoner's dilemma. 5
153 See, e.g., E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535-42 (1991) (discerning the original mean-
ing of the Warsaw Convention). This point is demonstrated broadly, not just in the context of choice-of-
law provisions, by Justice Marshall's opinion in Eastern Airlines. Id. While not explicitly stated, it is
clear one goal of this approach was to avoid any perception that the U.S. was deviating from the War-
saw Convention. See id.
154 See Ricardo Almeida, Problems of Jurisdiction and of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments and Arbitral Awards in India, in CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION 438, 448-66 (Teo Keang Sood et al. eds., 1997); Jan Paulsson, The New York Convention's
Misadventures in India, INT'L ARB. REP., June 1992, at 18, 18-2 1.
155 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 261, 262-
66 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002).
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This analysis carries important lessons for contemporary debates such
as the law governing the enforcement of foreign judgments. Since the Su-
preme Court's decision in Hilton v. Guyot,'56 states have moved away from
a reciprocity requirement, but the wisdom of that draft has been the subject
of much recent debate. Drafters of the American Law Institute's ("ALl")
proposed law on foreign judgment enforcement have reinserted a reciproc-
ity requirement into the draft law.'57 By contrast, drafters of the revised uni-
form state law on the enforcement of foreign money judgments rejected a
proposal to reinsert a reciprocity requirement.'58 The analysis offered here
suggests that the ALl drafters (and the original Hilton majority) may have
the better argument. Reinserting a reciprocity norm in the foreign judgment
law reduces other sovereigns' incentive to defect and provides an escape
device for the United States in case another sovereign does so.
3. Delegations to Organizations Whose Decisions are Not Auto-
matically Domesticated
When we shift from non-organizational delegations to organizational
ones, the cost-benefit analysis becomes more complex. Costs can be severe
but perhaps not as severe as critics of delegation often argue. Consider the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal demonstrates that the costs gener-
ated by second-best solutions sometimes are quite minor. What alternatives
were there? The United States might have simply demanded payment from
Iran through a U.S.-run dispute resolution process, but there was little indi-
cation at the time that Iran would be willing to pay. Alternatively, it might
have allowed U.S. plaintiffs to continue to pursue their claims in a federal
forum, but any outcome (while perhaps more remunerative than a tribunal
award) would surely have run into enforceability problems (to the extent
assets were unavailable to satisfy the award).
Sovereignty costs and risks of defection, however, are more salient, for
the United States is ceding its courts' authority to hear claims falling under
the Tribunal's jurisdiction.'59 Risks of defection depend on the extent to
which the agents of that organization (here the judges of the Tribunal) are
beholden to the states (principals) who create them. In Keohane's terms, the
risks of defection depend on the "independence" of the Tribunal. 6 ° The
156 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (explaining the application of comity and suggesting that extend-
ing comity to the laws of other nations is not a breach of sovereignty).
157 RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT DRAFT, supra note 102, § 7.
158 See UNIFORM MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT, supra note 102, § 4. For a fuller explication of the
reciprocity argument, see Katherine R. Miller, Playground Politics: Assessing the Wisdom of Writing a
Reciprocity Requirement into U.S. International Recognition and Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L.
239, 257-65 (2004).
159 See Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 107, art. 11.
160 See Keohane et al., supra note 1I, at 458-62.
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history of the tribunal has generally been a positive one but does include a
few examples of defection, particularly by the Iranian judges. 6' States
might structure organizations to avoid this problem through mechanisms
that ensure independence. Such mechanisms may reduce the risk of defec-
tion, but may accentuate other costs. Specifically, it may enhance the sover-
eignty costs caused by mission creep, particularly where the organization's
mandate is vaguely defined (in which case the need for escape devices
grows).'62 In sum, organizational delegations of jurisdiction entail more
substantial costs, and mechanisms for controlling some of those costs may
wor'sen others.
While costs are mixed, benefits can be substantial. As to cooperation,
the Iran-U.S. Tribunal example reveals that the "cooperative" benefit is
really the flipside of the "second-best" cost-the Tribunal accomplished an
outcome that neither party, acting unilaterally, could have achieved.'63 The
Tribunal also advanced several norms such as the peaceful resolution of
citizen-state disputes over expropriation of property that previously had
been addressed through fruitless domestic litigation or ineffective state-state
litigation." 4 Finally, the Tribunal also exemplifies the gains to be derived
through division of labor and specialization. The Tribunal developed one of
the most comprehensive bodies of jurisprudence interpreting the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Model
Arbitration Rules.'65 Though the Tribunal has completed its work, its juris-
prudence has proven instrumental in subsequent cases involving the
UNCITRAL Rules as well as the international law governing expropria-
tions. "'66
161 BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 104, at 22-25, 153-81 (describing the challenges of Iranian
judicial defection and challenges of international justices). Judge Brower also summarizes the success of
the Tribunal despite the difficulties presented by Iranian defections and challenges. Id. at 657-69.
162 See Keohane et al., supra note 11, at 461-62.
163 RICHARD B. LILLICH, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, 1981-1983, at vii (1984)
(referring to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal as the "most significant arbitral body in history").
164 GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
43, 217-42 (1996) (explaining resolutions for conflicts arising from the expropriation of property).
"From my perspective," Aldrich writes, "the Tribunal has largely succeeded ... in doing justice to the
parties before it. In the process, the Tribunal has created a jurisprudence that represents a significant
contribution to the development of international law.... Id. at 43.
165 See generally Stewart A. Baker & Mark D. Davis, Arbitral Proceedings Under the UNCITRAL
Rules-The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
267 passim (1989).
166 See id.; Christopher S. Gibson & Christopher R. Drahozal, Iran-United States Claim Tribunal
Precedent in Investor-State Arbitration, 23 J. INT'L ARB. 521,531-32 (2006).
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4. Delegations To Organizations Whose Decisions Are Automati-
cally Domesticated
As with the preceding category, the mix of costs and benefits here is
complex. Costs are more pronounced in cases of delegations to an institu-
tion whose decisions have an automatic domestic effect. Sovereignty costs
are even higher than in the preceding category: the delegating sovereign
loses the ability to utilize its domestic institutions as escape devices to pre-
vent unwarranted expansions of the institution's mandate. In automatic do-
mestication cases, the only effective escape device may be exit from the
treaty regime entirely. So too is there a risk of second-best outcomes: the
European Commission exemplifies how the transnational institution may
render a decision in the economic interest of the Community even if it is an
inferior outcome with respect to a local industry or economy that a particu-
lar member state has sought to protect. 67 At the same time, risk of defection
by other sovereigns is low because automatic domestication reduces the
role of their domestic institutions in implementation. Delegations with an
automatic domestic effect thus display an inverse relationship with respect
to two costs: as sovereignty costs rise, risks of defection decline.
On the benefit side, examples such as the European Community dem-
onstrate the advantages. The common market created by the European
Community, enabling the "four freedoms" of movement, demonstrates the
benefits of cooperation.' 68 The European Community also demonstrates
how these organizations can advance international norms. (By contrast, the
less successful attempt to establish a European Constitution demonstrates
how the institution sometimes can "overreach" in attempting to advance a
set of norms beyond those that the constituent sovereign entities are pre-
pared to extend.) Finally, the EC displays the specialization benefits to be
derived from these sorts of delegations; the development of antitrust exper-
tise in the EC's competition directorate provides a particularly salient ex-
ample. 1
69
167 A classic example is its assault on the "Notar" system in certain member nations as a restriction
on the free movement of services. Commission Says Notaries Must Open up to Foreigners, EURACTIV,
Oct. 13, 2006, http://www.euractiv.com/en/competition/commission-notaries-open-foreigners/article-
158768.
168 See generally CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU 3 (2d ed. 2007)
(identifying the Four Freedoms as the free movement of goods, the free movement of capital, the free
movement of services, and the free movement of persons).
169 See generally David J. Gerber, Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law, 31
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1235 passim (2008).
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C. Lessons for Medellin
This Essay opened with the case of Medellin v. Texas17° as an example
of the broader theoretical issues about delegation explored herein. It is per-
haps appropriate therefore to close by sketching out the lessons of this
analysis for that case. Medellin's discussion of the New York Convention
and foreign judgment enforcement vindicates the model developed here. It
reflects an awareness that treaty obligations such as those at issue in the
Vienna Convention do share a conceptual similarity with those obligations
on topics such as the enforcement of arbitral awards that have been largely
excluded from the delegation debate in the literature.
Medellin does not, however, entirely foreclose the possibility of a
delegation ever having automatic domestic effect. The European Commu-
nity demonstrates that such systems are not unattainable. Here it is impor-
tant to understand how the doctrine of direct effect evolved in the European
Community and to contrast its evolution with the norms at stake in Medel-
lin. When it developed the doctrine of direct effect, the European Court of
Justice still required a degree of cooperation from Europe's domestic actors
(even if their compliance was, strictly speaking, not legally required).'71
Thus, as Joseph Weiler has observed, the European Court of Justice did not
seek out the most controversial, intractable issues among the European
states in which to articulate the doctrine; it chose issues on which to articu-
late the doctrine of direct effect that were relatively non-controversial
among the member states of the European community.'72 As a result, the
mechanism of domestic absorption was relatively uncontroversial.' Con-
trast that with Medellin. Medellin presented a true divergence between the
domestic political views and the international norms on an issue (there the
death penalty). Recent studies indicate that the American public remains
deeply divided over the death penalty with a (declining) majority of the
country still favoring it.'74 International norms, by contrast, are squarely
aligned against it.'75 Thus, advocates trying to incorporate a doctrine of di-
170 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
171 Alicia Farrell Miller, Note, The Preliminary Reference Procedure of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities: A Model for the ICJ?, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 669, 669-70
(2009).
172 Weiler, supra note 64, at 2413-14.
173 Id. at 2405-07.
174 For recent research synthesizing public opinion on the death penalty, see Catherine Appleton &
Bent Grover, The Pros and Cons of Life Without Parole, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 597, 605 & n.29
(2007) (citing a 2006 Gallup poll indicating half of Americans favored the death penalty); Corinna
Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 22-23 (2007) (noting that at the time of the Supreme
Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), public opinion favored the death penalty by
a 2:1 margin).
175 For example, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Supreme Court cited an interna-
tional trend against execution of minors. Id. at 567, 575. Similarly, one sticking point in the negotiations
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rect effect or its analogue in the Medellin case picked a poor case by which
to effect that strategy. In short, they did not learn the lessons of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.
Indeed, the broader lesson from Medellin may be that, even where it
lacks effect as "hard law," decisions that lack automatic domestication
nonetheless can have an important indirect impact as soft law.'76 Such
judgments may not receive an automatic domestic effect, but they still in-
fluence the domestic political process potentially in more politically ac-
countable ways. For example, in the wake of some decisions by the ICJ
prior to the Avena 77/Medellin litigation, some governors commuted death
sentences of individuals, perhaps in response to some of the pressure com-
ing from these international tribunals.'78 Thus, the most interesting aspect of
Medellin may not be its outcome but how it influences the strategy of those
who advocate the integration of international tribunals' decisions into our
domestic system. One might expect these advocates to rely to a greater de-
gree on "soft law" methods to bridge the dissensus between the domestic
political norms and the international norms in order to facilitate the transi-
tion that occurred in the EU before direct effect took hold.
CONCLUSION
This Essay seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate in the academy
and policy circles over delegation. A central problem with that debate, in
my view, has been an unduly narrow definition of the term, one that skews
the analysis of costs and benefits. A broader definition of the term, one de-
coupled from the explicit creation of organizations and bureaucracies, more
accurately captures the policy concerns underlying the debate. Viewed in
those terms, delegation is best understood as a conflicts-of-law problem, an
insight that conflicts titans such as Huber and Story recognized. A four-part
over Turkey's accession to the European Community turns on that country's willingness to abolish
capital punishment. Seda Cifici, Turkey Update: Turkey and the European Union: Heading for a
Break?, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD., Mar. 8, 2002, at 1-2, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/
pubs/tu020308.pdf.
176 See, e.g., A.E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT'L.
& COMP. L.Q. 901, 902-12 (1999); C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and
Change in International Law, 38 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 850, 850-52, 859-62 (1989); Hartmut Hillgen-
berg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499, 508-11 (1999). For a very recent article exam-
ining the influence of international tribunal decisions on domestic legal norms, see William W. Burke-
White, The Domestic Influence of International Criminal Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, 46
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279, 289-309 (2008).
177 Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
178 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Gov. Brad Henry, Gov. Henry Grants Clemency to Death
Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.gov.ok.gov/displayarticle.php?article id=
301&article-type=l.
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typology provides a tool by which one can better evaluate the desirability of
a given delegation. While the typology and description of the tradeoffs of-
fered here may advance the discussion, this Essay raises as many questions
as it answers, charting a course for future research. I briefly identify two
avenues here.
First, as a positive matter, the model requires more systematic testing.
The typology developed in Part II supplies various examples for the pro-
posed categories, but the treatment is not exhaustive. A variety of delega-
tions, under the definition proffered here, have not been classified. Moreo-
ver, further research can test the explanatory value of the model by examin-
ing whether certain delegations fall within more than one camp (such as the
ICJ) and thereby call into doubt the explanatory value of the typology.
Second, as a normative matter, further research is necessary on how to
balance the costs and benefits. The argument developed in Part III provided
an analytic tool to measure how some of the perceived costs and benefits of
delegation mapped onto the categories in the typology. Yet it offered rela-
tively little guidance about how policymakers, or society more generally,
are supposed to balance those competing considerations and determine
whether the risk of payoff from a particular set of benefits justifies the ex-
pected costs of a given delegation. Further normative scholarship can help
illuminate this topic too.
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